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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

W. W. & W. B. GARDNER, INC.,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
Case No. 14814

vs.
SUMMIT LIMITED, a California
limited partnership, et al,
Defendant
and Appellant.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

NATURE OF THE CASE

This is an action brought by plaintiff against the
cwners and developers of Park West Village, a subdivision located in Summit County, Utah, to recover compensation for plaintiff's installation of asphalt paving throughout the subdivision.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
On

motion of plaintiff, the trial court on September

22, 1976 entered default judgment and summary judgment against

defendant Sumrr.it Limited.

[R. 688-91).

On October 12, 1976,
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Summit Limited filed a Notice of Appeal with the district court.
[R. 694].

On November 30, 1976, Summit Limited moved the lower

court for relief from the judgment theretofore entered by that
court.

On

December 8, 1976 the district court denied the motion

of Summit Limited for relief from judgment.

[R. 709-10].

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-respondent requests that the district court's
order granting summary judgment and default judgment against defendant Summit Limited be affirmed.

·IJ
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In July of 1972, Park West Village, Inc., a Utah corporation, created a subdivision known as "Park West Village" in
Summit County, Utah.

[Depo. Elwood L. Nielsen pp. 10-11; R.

523\ R. 121-22 (requests 1, 2, and 3); R. 249-51 (interrogatories 7, 8, 11, 18)].

The Park West Village subdivision con-

tained approximately thirty-nine lots of varying sizes.
[R.
523 1 ]. On July 6, 1972, Park West Village, Inc. and others executed a certain Subdivision Bond, which ran in favor of Summit
County and secured the completion of all improvements upon the
subdivision required by Summit County, including streets and
roads.

[Depo. Elwood L. Nielsen, pp. 22-23; R. 64; R. 122 (re-

quests 4, 5)].
Thereafter, Park West Village, Inc. conveyed the

1/ The subdivision plat found at $. 523 is filed out of order
and is Exhibit "A" to plaintiff's answers to interrogatc•ries
found at R. 518-521.
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subdivision to National Property Management, Inc., a California
corporation, pursuant to a certain "Agreement" dated November
15, 1973.

[Deposition of Elwood L. Nielsen, p. 54, Exh. P-21;

R. 636-639].

For the convenience of the Court, this Agreement
is reproduced following the body of this Brief. 2 The Agreement

in part provided that National Property Management would perform all obligations to comply with the requirements of Summit
County concerning subdivisions, including the construction of
roads.

[Agreement, paragraph 21.E, Plaintiff's App. 9-10).

Paragraph 23 of the said Agreement further provided that the
Subdivision Bond was assigned to National Property Management
and that National Property Management "agrees to perform all
requirements of construction of said improvements as_ required by
Summit County" and "agrees to render said improvements as required by this Paragraph and complete the same in a manner
ceptable to Summit County by July 15, 1974."

ac~

The vast majority,

in dollar value, of improvements required by Summit County was
represented by installation of streets and roads upon the subdivision.

[Depo. Elwood L. Nielsen, pp. 14, 22-23, 26-27; Exh.

P-3: Depo. Robert Krause, p. 7-8.)

As of the time that the

Agreement was executed, therefore, National Property Management
undertook to complete the paving of streets and roads within
the subdivision.

[Depo. Elwood L. Nielsen, p. 32).

The Agree-

ment contemplated that Park West Village, Inc. would convey fee
title to various parcels as National Property Management made

'!:_/ Defendant Stull!Ilit Limtied included in its Brief an Appendix
of various portions of the record, which Appendix will hereafter be referred to and cited as "Defendant's Appendix".
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certain payments.

Pursuant to this arrangement, Park West Vil-

lage, Inc. conveyed Lots 1. 4, 5, a portion of 16, 21, 23. and
25 of the subdivision and an adjoining 3.6 acre tract to National
Property Management.

[R. 636].

On November 15. 1973, the same date upon which the

Agreement referred to above (hereinafter, the "NPM Agreement")
was executed, National Property Management conveyed the subdivision to Summit Limited.

This second contemporaneous conveyance

was accomplished through an "Agreement" strikingly similar to
the NPM Agreement, which second agreement will hereinafter be
referred to. as the "Summit Limited Agreement."

The following

provisions are contained in paragraph 21 of the Summit Limited
Agreement:
21. The parties hereto understand that
Seller [National Property Management] has
acquired the subject property from Park West
Village, Inc., under an installment sale contract. In the event of an antici ated default by Se er in its o igations un er said
contract, Seller hereby agrees to assign all
of its right, title, and interest in and to
said contract to Buyer [Summit Limited] hereunder such that Bu er can assume Seller's
losition in sai contract.
Emp asis a ed)
Defendant's App. 29;-~667].
As Summit Limited and National Property Management accurately
predicted, National Property Management did default in its obligations under the NPM Agreement.
pp. 63-65].

[Depo." Elwood L. Nielsen,

Thereafter, National Property Management regarded

the subdivision as the property of Summit Limited, [Depo. Richard
Hallmark, p. 23], and Steven Bauer (then a limited partner and
now the general partner of Sunnnit Limited) was in charge of
the Park West Village Subdivision development.
Krause, pp. 9-10].

Pursu~nt

[Depo. Robert

to the Summit Limited Agreement,
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National Property Management then conveyed lots 1, 4, 5, 16, 23,
and 25 of the subdivision to Surrnnit Limited.

[R. 643].

Follow-

ing the execution of the Summit Limited Agreement, National Property Management ceased development of the subdivision, and
Surrnnit Limited was to commence improvement of the sub.division.
[Depo. Robert Krause, pp. 13-14].
is now insolvent and has no assets.

National Property Management
[Depo. Richard Hallmark,

p. 11].

After the foregoing machinations had been concluded,
plaintiff W. W. & W. B. Gardner, Inc. entered into a contract
to install asphaltic concrete paving throughout the subdivision.
[R. 623-27].

On

its face, the contract purported to be between

plaintiff and Ski Park City West, Inc., but in fact Ski Park
City West, Inc. had absolutely no interest in or connection with
the subdivision.

[Depo. Robert Krause, p. 34; Depo. Richard

Hallmark, pp. 21-22, 28].

Rather, Ski Park City West, Inc. was

an entity closely related to SUIIUI1it Limited and National Property Management.

Plaintiff performed its obligations under

its agreement and is owed approximately $38,000.00 therefor.
[R. 625].
Critical to this case is the relationship between.a
myriad of California-based organizations:

Condor International

Corp., Ski Park City West, Inc., National Property Management,
Inc., and Summit Limited.
Condor International Corp. ("Condor") is a California
corporation.

At all times material to this action, Richard

Hallmark was the president of Condor [Depo. Richard Hallmark,
p. 6] and Roy Webley was an officer of Condor [Depo. Robert
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Krause pp. 35-36].

At all times material hereto, Condor was the

sole general partner of Summit Limited.

[Depo. Richard Hallmark,

p. 7; R. 671, Defendant's App. 55].
Ski Park City West, Inc. is a Utah corporation having
connnon officers with Condor.

Hallmark was a director and Vice-

President [Depo. Richard Hallmark, p. 3], Webley was an officer
[Depo. Robert Krause, pp. 35-36], and Robert Krause was a VicePresident [Depo. Robert Krause, pp. 3-4, 25].
National Property Management is a Utah corporation that
is a wholly owned subsidiary of Ski Park City West, having common officers with both Condor and Ski Park City West.
Richard Hallmark, pp. 4, 6; Depo. Robert Krause, p. 4].

[Depo.
Hall-

mark was an officer [Depo. Richard Hallmark, p. 3], and Krause
was the President [Depo. Robert Krause, pp. 3-4, 25] of National
Property Management.

Ski Park City West and National Property

Management acted as one entity, and had directors and managers
that functioned in common.

[Depo. Richard Hallmark, p. 28;

Depo. Robert Krause, p. 4].
Summit Limited is a California limited partnership that
was organized by Roy Webley (an officer of both Condor and Ski
Park City West) and Steven H. Bauer.
5].

[Depo. Robert Krause, p.

As already noted, Condor was the sole general partner of

Summit Limited [Exhibit 3 to Depos. Hallmark and Krause; R. 672;
Defendant's App., 57-58].

The Certificate of Limited Partner-

ship of Sunnnit Limited indicates its principal place of business
as the same address as that of Condor and Messrs. Bauer, Webley,
Hallmark, and Krause.

[Depo. Robert Krause, pp. 3, 36-37; Depo.

Richard Hallmark, p. 3].
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It is obvious from the foregoing that Summit Limited,
Ski Park City West, National Property Management, and Condor
International are all but component parts of an integrally connected maze of California-based entities.

Hallmark, who signed

the contract with plaintiff, was the President of Condor, the
general partner of Sunnnit Limited.

Hallmark signed that docu-

ment at the behest of Roy Webley, also an officer of Condor and,
not coincidentally, an organizer and limited partner of Sunnnit
Limited.

At a time when "Ski Park and National Property Manage-

ment were having their own financial problems," (both are now
insolvent), Webley (a limited partner of Summit Limited) caused
Hallmark (the President of the general partner of Summit Limited)
tc execute the contract with plaintiff,

purporte~ly

on behalf of

Ski Park City West, which had absolutely no interest in the subdivision!

[Depo. Richard Hallmark, p. 11, 23].
The foregoing is the factual complex out of which this

action arises.

A discussion of the proceedings below that cul-

minated in the judgment on appeal is reserved for the arguments
that follow.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY GRANTED
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT.

Rule 37(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides in
pertinent part as follows:
If a party . . . fails
(2) to serve
answers or objections to interrogatories
submitted under Rule 33, after proper service of the interrogatories, or (3) to
serve a written response to a request for
inspection submitted under Rule 34, after
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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proper service of the request, the court in
which the action is pending on motion may make
such orders in regard to the failure as are
just, and among others it may take any action
authorized under paragraphs (A), (B), and (C)
of subdivision (b)(2) of this rule.
Subdivision (b)(2), paragraph C of Rule 37 prescribes that the
court may render "a judgment by default against the disobedient
party."

The trial court, pursuant to the rule just quoted, en-

tered a default judgment against defendant Summit

fer

Limit~d

its persistent failure timely or properly to respond to plaintiff's discovery requests.

[R. 690].

The actions of defendant Sunnnit Limited below reflect
a persistent, knowing, and deliberate refusal to comply with the
rules of civil procedure:
1.

On October 23, 1973, plaintiff duly served upon

Summit Limited its First Set of Interrogatories.

[R. 309; R.

688).

2.

On July 6, 1976, plaintiff duly served upon

Summit Limited its Third Set of Interrogatories.

[R. 532; R.

689].

3.

On July 6, 1976, plaintiff duly served upon Summit

Limited its Request for Admissions of Facts.
4.

[R. 541; R. 689].

On July 12. 1976, plaintiff duly served upon Summit

Limited its Request for Production of Documents.
5.

[R. 587].

On August 9, 1976, plaintiff again duly served

upon Summit Limited its Third Set of Interrogatories.

[R. 608;

R. 689].

6.

On August 9, 1976, plaintiff again duly

s~rved

upon Summit Limited its Request for Admission of Facts.
608; R. 689] .

[R.
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7.

On August 9, 1976, plaintiff again duly served

cpon Summit Limited its Request for Production of Documents.
(R. 608).

As of September 3, 1976, Summit Limited had responded
to none of the above-described discovery requests.

On that

Gate, plaintiff served upon Summit Limited and filed its Motion
for Summary Judgment and Motion for Entry of Default Judgment.
[R. 620).

On September 15, 1976, after receipt of plaintiff's

Motion, but prior to the hearing thereon, Summit Limited served
upon plaintiff responses to
-- ten months late,

(2)

(1)

First Set of Interrogatories

Third Set of Interrogatories -- one

and one-half months late, and

(3)

Requests for Admissions of

Fact -- one and one-half months late.

[R. 655) .. Summit Limited

to this day has not filed a response to plaintiff's Request for
Production of Documents.
Summit Limited in its Brief does not and reasonably
cannot question the truth of the foregoing recitations of facts.
Those facts conclusively demonstrate that Sunnnit Limited simply
ignored plaintiff's discovery requests until it received plaintiff's motion to enter the default of Summit Limited, at which
time Summit Limited in short order responded to all discovery
requests save plaintiff's Request for Production of Documents.
The trial court properly concluded that "the failure of Sunnnit
Limited timely to respond to said discovery requests was without excuse or justification," and that "the failure by defendant Summit Limited timely to respond to plaintiff's said discovery requests caused delay in the prosecution of these proceedings and substantial additional expense to plaintiff."
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[R. 689].

The trial court accordingly entered a default judgment

against Summit Limited.
Summit Limited raises a number of obviously erroneous
arguments in an effort to invalidate the lower court's order.
Most of its arguments are spurious and can be disposed of summarily.
Sunnnit Limited first argues that since plaintiff amended
its complaint on July 19, 1976, no response to any discovery request was due until 45 days thereafter.
12).

[Appellant's Brief, p.

Rules 33(a), 34(b), and 36(a), Utah Rules of Civil Proce-

dure, all prescribe that responses to interrogatories, document
requests, and requests for admissions, respectively, are due 30
days after service of same except that a defendant is not required so to respond until "45 days after service of summons and
complaint upon that defendant."

Thus, the 45 day period for

response only applies in the case of original service of sunrrnons
and complaint upon the defendant. 3 Sunnnit Limited was served
with summons and complaint on October 2, 1975 [R. 185] -- eleven
months prior to service of Summit Limited's responses.
the 45 day rule is obviously inapplicable here.

Thus,

Even assuming

(as Summit Limited does throughout its Brief) that the 45 day
period was applicable, Summit Limited was still substantially
late in responding to those requests to which it did respond.
Summit Limited secondly argues that Rule 37(d) authorizes imposition of sanctions only for no responses, and not
3/ The purpose of additional time for response following initial service is clear -- to enable defendant to engage counsel
and prepare to defend. That object is clearly absent in the
case of subsequent service of an amended complaint.
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for tardy responses, to discovery requests.
Brief, pp. 8-11].

[Appellant's

This Court's adoption of that absurd argu-

ment would advise parties and counsel that they may cavalierly
ignore discovery requests until a motion for sanctions is filed
without fear of repercussion.

Predictably, the courts and the

language of Rule 37(d) reject Summit Limited's argument.

Rule

37(d) prescribes that a trial court can impose sanctions upon
a party's failure to serve responses to discovery requests.
The court in Naive v. Jones, 353 S.W. 2d 365 (Ky. 1961) construed that clear language in the context of facts strikingly
similar to those here presented.

In

~aive,

plaintiff filed

answers to interrogatories three months late, after receiving
a motion for sanctions but before the hearing of same.

The

trial court dismissed plaintiff's case and on appeal plaintiff,
like Summit Limited, argued that the court lacked authority to
dismiss under those circumstances.

The appellate court, affirm-

ing, responded:
Plaintiff's principal contention seems
to be that the trial court lacked authority
to proceed as it did. He contends there
cannot be a violation of Rule 33 by mere delay in answering, and the words "fails to-serve answers" means that the party must
absolutely and positively refuse to answer.
This argument is not persuasive. Rule 33
requires answers to be served within a specified number of days. If no answer is served
within that time, then the party has failed
to answer. Such a failure is itself a positive refusal to comply as required. Consequently it constitutes a violation of Rule
33 in the manner condemned by CR 37.05,
which empowers the court to dismiss the action. Id. at 366 (Emphasis original).
Similarly, in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Echols,
138 Ga.App. 593, 226 S.E.2d 742 (1976), the court, affirming a
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dismissal for tardy responses to interrogatories, observed:
Nor is there any significance in the fact
that the plaintiff allegedly submitted answers
to the propounded questions before the hearing
on defendant's motion for sanctions. "[O]nce
the motion for sanctions has been filed, the
opposite party may not preclude their imposition by making belated response at the hearing." This applies as well to responses made
in the interim between the filing of a motion
for sanctions and the hearing on the motion.
226 S.E.2d at 743.
(Citations omitted).
A number of other appellate courts have likewise affirmed dismissals or defaults imposed for tardy responses to
interrogatories served after receipt of a motion for sanctions,
but before the hearing of same.

~.

United States v. Continen-

tal Cas. Co., 303 F.2d 91, 92-93 (4th Cir. 1962); Houston General Ins. Co. v. Stein Steel & Supply Co., 134 Fla.App. 624, 215
S.E.2d 511 (1975); Lynch v. R. E. Tull & Sons, Inc., 251 Md.
260, 247 A.2d 287 (1968).

Therefore,

Judge Leary clearly had

the power to enter the default of Surmnit Limited for its tardy
filing of interrogatory responses, not to mention its complete
failure to file a response to the request to production of documents as required by Rule 34(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Third, Summit Limited seeks this Court's indulgence
because Summit Limited was purportedly represented by a layman -- Mr. Steven H. Bauer, its general partner.
Brief, pp. 11, 12].

[Appellant's

As plaintiff advised the lower court, Sum-

mit Limited's ostensible lay representation is nothing more
than a fiction -- plaintiff's counsel at various times during
these proceedings conunur:icated with the law firm of Rimel

&

Helsing of Santa Ana, California concerning Surmnit Limited's
role in this case and indeed concerning the hearing of plainSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tiff's motion for default judgment.
64].

[Defendant's App. p. 63-

Each and every pleading filed in this case by SUIIIlilit Limi-

ted is filed on pre-printed pleading paper [R. 328, 615, 643,
656, 660, 668, 670, 694, 696], and many bear the name of the
Santa Ana, California law firm of Rimel & Helsing in the lower
left-hand corner, [R. 329, 615 (masked), 694], and many utilize
pre-printed mailing certificates.

[R. 618 1 619, 655, 659, 694-.

Finally, each paper filed in this case by Summit Limited bears
the unmistakeable index of a lawyer's presence -- legal jargon
and legalease.

If Mr. Bauer would have this Court belive that

he prepared those papers, he will concurrently convince this
Court that he is quite learned in the law and not entitled to
any leniency that might otherwise attach to his being ignorant
of the law.

At the very least, Mr. Bauer demonstrated that he

knew how to respond to discovery when a default judgment was
threatened.
Finally, Sununit Limited raises the only genuine issue
concerning the propriety of the lower court's default judgment
-- Did the lower court abuse its discretion?

[Appellant's

Brief, pp. 12-15].
Appellant Summit Limited has a difficult burden on
this facet of its appeal.

In !ucker Realty, Inc. v. Nunley, 16

Ut~h 2d 97, 396 P.2d 410 (1964), a case where as here defendant

sought to reverse a default judgment entered for failure timely
and fully to respond to discovery requests, this Court stated:
We first note the basic premise on
appeal: That the judgment is presumed to
be correct, and that the burden of establishing its invalidity is upon the party
attacking it. 396 P.2d at 412-13.
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Further, a court's imposition of sanctions pursuant to Rule 37
is discretionary with the trial court and will not be disturbed
on appeal unless a clear abuse of discretion is demonstrated:
Sanctions for refusal to comply with an order of court or for failure to respond are set
out in Rule 37, U.R.C.P., and are discretionary
with the court.

***
In the absence of an absue of discretion,
we should not undertake to substitute our idea
of what is proper for that of the trial court.
The law is stated in 5 Am.Jur 2d, Appeal and
Error, as follow~~:

***
. [A] discretionary determination
may be "reviewed" only in the case of a
"gross " "clear " "plain " "palable " or
"manif~st" abus~ of disc~etion.
Leasin! Cor~. v. Murra~ First Thrift & Loan Co. ,
53 P.2 1244, 124 (Utah 1975).

G.M.

Under the circumstances presented in this case, no such abuse of
discretion can be demonstrated.
The record in this case demonstrates that Summit
Limited was duly served with two sets of interrogatories, one
request for production of documents, and one request for admissions.

Further, after Sunnnit Limited was out of time in respond-

ing to the third set of interrogatories, requests for admission,
and request for production, plaintiff for the second time duly
served those pleadings on Sununit Limited,

The time for response

pursuant to the second service of those pleadings also expired
without response from Summit Limited.

Only after Sunnnit Limited

was served with plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and to
enter default judgment did Sunrrnit Limited respond to any discovery.

In some cases, Sunnnit Limited's responses were ten
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months late.

Sunnnit Limited

~

filed a response to plain-

tiff's request for production of documents.

Summit Limited's

belated responses indicate that it knew how to respond, but did
not choose to do so until faced with a default judgment.

Summit

Limited never sought an extension from either plaintiff or the
Court.

Moreover, it should be noted that each discovery request

plainly stated on the first page the time within which a response
was required.

Finally, Summit Limited did not even bother to

appear at the hearing of plaintiff's motion, but now argues that
the trial judge erred in various respects that were never presented to the trial court.

Upon the foregoing compelling facts

and the authorities discussed below, it cannot be said that the
trial court abused its discretion in entering the default of
Summit Limited.
This Court has twice affirmed the sanction of dismissal
or default where a party fails fully or timely to respond to discovery requests.

In Tucker Realty, Inc. v. Nunley, 16 Utah

2d 97, 396 P.2d 410 (1964), plaintiff moved the court for and
obtained an order of production. 4 At the pretrial conference,
the court directed defendant to produce pursuant to the prior
order..

Thereafter, the defendant produced some documents, but

did not produce others that defendant had theretofore indicated
existed.

Plaintiff moved for a default judgment, which the

trial court granted,

On appeal, this Court affirmed, emphasizing

4/ Prior to the 1972 amendments to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a request for production absent an order of.the co~rt was
not permitted; presently, of course, no such order is required.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 34 (Volume 9, Utah Code Ann.
(1953) and 1975 Supp.).
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the discretionary character of a trial court 1 s imposition of
sanctions:
Whether the failure to comply with the court's
order had been wilful and whether the circumstances are so aggravated as to justify the action taken is primarily for the trial court to
determine. Unless it is shown that his action
is without su~port on the record, or is a plain
abuse of discretion, it should not be disturbed.
396 P.2d at 412-13.
Likewise, in Barber v. Calder, 522 P.2d 700 (Utah 1974), plaintiffs brought an action against defendants, husband and wife.
Defendants'~

("not an attorney of record in Utah," 522 P.2d

at 701) prepared an answer, which his parents signed, served,
and filed.

Thereafter, plaintiffs served interrogatories and

requests for admissions upon defendants.

One and one-half

months after such service, plaintiffs served defendants with a
motion for sanctions, pursuant to which the court ordered that
answers be filed within ten days.

One and one-half months later,

defendants not having answered, the court on motion entered the
default of defendants.

Defendants then retained counsel, who

filed a petition to set aside the default, which petition was
denied by the trial court.

This Court affirmed the trial court,

reasoning as follows:
It is true as defendants assert that this
court has on numerous occasions declared as
a matter of general policy that whenever the
interests of justice and fair play will be
served thereby, the trial court should exercise its discretion liberally in favor of
giving the parties an opportunity for a hearing on the merits of a case. However, discretion is not a one way street. As is sometimes said: No pancake can be fried so thin
that it does not have two sides. Both parties have rights which it is the res onsi1 ity o
tne tria court to protect. In
•ituations where the exercise of discretion
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is a ro riate, considerable wei ht should
oe iven to t e etermination 0 t e trraT
court, whichever way it goes, T is is true
oecause due to his close involvement with
the parties, the witnesses and the total
circumstances of the case,'he is in the
best position to judge what the interests
of justice require in safeguarding the
rights and interests of all parties concerned. Id. at 701-02 (Emphasis added).
Significantly, in

~arber,

defendants were apparently represented

by a layman and only four and one-half months elapsed between
service of two discovery requests and entry of defendants' default.
~erved

Here, four discovery requests were served -- most were
twice -- and eleven months elapsed between service of

some and the entry of default judgment.

Although in Barber no

responses were filed by defendants, and hence the Court had no
way of knowing whether the lay defendants understood the neces-·
sity of response, here Summit Limited proved that it knew how
to respond, but only after being faced with the prospect of default.
It has been demonstrated above that the district court
clearly had the power to enter a default judgment against Summit
Limited for its eleventh hour responses to some requests and its
outright failure to file a response to the request for producSummit Limited emphasizes that it did eventually respond to the requests. 5 Nevertheless, compelling con-

tion of documents.

siderations of policy demand that the lower court be affirmed.
If a lower court abuses its discretion by imposing
sanctions under the circumstances presented here, the recipients

5/ Summit Limited consistently overlooks the fact that it has
never filed a response to the request for production as required
by Rule 34 (b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
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I

l

il

j

of discovery requests in the future may safely ignore the same until served with a motion for sanctions, at which time they may
serve their tardy responses without fear of substantial detriment.
If the discovery rules are to serve their purpose without constant participation by and imposition upon the courts, those rules
must be respected.

Such considerations have motivated the courts

to uphold default judgments under circumstances less aggravated
than those presented here.
In Spradling v. Boone County Planning Corrrrn., 461 S.W.
2d 548 (Ky. 1970), the Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed a trial
court's dismissal against a plaintiff that served answers to interrogatories only one month late, after a motion for sanctions
but before the hearing of same.

The court noted that defendant

had sought no extension and reasoned as follows:
In the case of Baltimore & Ohio Railroad
Company v. Carrier, Ky., 426 S.W.2d 938. the
court said there is a presumption that the
Rules of Civil Procedure are designed to provide litigants with swift and speedy relief.
In sustaining the default judgment because
of delay, this court said at page 941: "If
the Rules of Civil Procedure are to servethe
ur ose for which the
desi
the
I . at
Emp
Similarly, in Lynch v. R.E. Tull & Sons, Inc., 251 Md. 260, 247
A.2d 287 (1968), the court affirmed the trial court's entry of
a default judgment against a defendant that served answers to
interrogatories only four months late, after service of a motion for sanctions but before the hearing of same, reasoning that
defendant was flagrantly dilatory.

That defendant's dilatori-

ness was minor compared to that of Summit Limited.

Again, in

Houston General Ins. Co. v. Stein Steel & Supply Co., 134 Ga.
215 S.E.2d 511 (1975), United States v. Continental
App. 624,
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Cas. Co., 303 F,2d 91 (4th Cir, 1962), and Naive v. Jones, 353
S.W.2d 365 (Ky. 1961), the courts under virtually identical circumstances affirmed default judgments entered after tardy responses were filed.

In none of the foregoing cases had the trial

court entered any order compelling responses prior to entry of
the default judgment.
Rule 37(d) authorizes the action taken by the district
court.

The district court found that Sunnnit Limited's conduct

was "without excuse or justification" and "caused delay in the
prosecution of these proc:eedings and substantial additional expense to plaintiff."

[R. 689].

stantial support on the record.

Those determinations find subSunnnit Limited, which did not

see fit even to appear at the hearing of plaintiff's motion
and give the district court the benefit of its views, is in no
position now to argue that the district court abused its discretion.

Further, after hearing the arguments of Sunnnit Limi-

ted' s present counsel at the motion for relief from the default judgment, the trial court found that "Sunnnit Limited has
failed to demonstrate any mistake, inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect, or any other reason
this operation of the judgment.
II.

ju~tifying

relief from

[R. 710].

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY GRANTED
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

Before addressing the propriety of the district court's
sunnnary judgment, the body of facts to be considered, as revealed by the record, must first be ascertained,

The statement

of facts contained in the beginning of this Brief derive only
from the depositions, affidavits, and answers to interrogatories
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on file in this case -- no reliance was there placed upon the
deemed admissions of Summit Limited, which are discussed below.
We submit that those facts, unaided by the deemed admissions of
Summit Limited, support the lower court's judgment,

However, if

this Court concludes, as did the lower court, that by failing
timely to answer plaintiff's request,s for admission, the requests
were admitted, plaintiff is unquestionably entitled to its judgment.
A.

Surrnnit Limited is bound b its failure
to respond to ~ ainti
s requests or
admissions of act.

Rule 36, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides in
pertinent part as follows:
(a)

***

Each matter of which an admission is requested shall be separately set forth. The
matter is admitted unless, within 30 da S"atter
service o t e request, or wit in suc1 s orter
or longer time as the court may allow, the
party to whom the request is directed serves
u on the arty re uestin the admission a written answer or o jection a resse to t e matter, signed by the party or by his attorney.

***
(b)

An

matter admitted under this rule is
the court

On July 6, 1976, and again on August 9, 1976, plaintiff duly
served upon Summit Limited its Request for Admission of Facts.
[R. 541, 608, 689].

That pleading on the first page contained

the following language:
Each matter hereinafter set forth will be
deemed admitted unless, within 30 days after
the service of this Request for Admission upon
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said defendant, said defendant serves upon
the undersigned a written answer or objection addressed to the matter, signed by
said defendant or its attorney,
Surrrrnit Limited did not respond to plaintiff's request for admissions until after plaintiff served its motion for summary judgment.

[R. 668].

Surrrrnit Limited's response was served 71 days

after the fir.st service and 47 days after the second service by
plaintiff.

Summit Limited at no time sought leave of the court

to file tardy responses, nor did Sunnnit Limited move the court
pursuant to Rule 36(b) to withdraw or amend its admissions that
occurred upon its failure timely to respond,
This Court on a number of occasions has affirmed summary judgments based upon a party's admissions arising from his
failure to respond to requests for admissions. - In Bennion v.
Amoss, 28 Utah 2d 216, 500 P.2d 512 (1972), this Court utilized
such a failure to respond to establish the admissions there in
question and observed:
Rule 36 provides that each matter of which
an admission is requested is deemed admitted if not answered within the time reuired. 500 P.2d at 516 n. 10 (emphasis
added .
Again, in Williams v. Greene, 29 Utah 2d 141, 406 P.2d 64 (1973),
the Court stated:
(D]efendant, under the discovery process,
requested admission of facts (R~le.36, ~tah
Rules of Civil Procedure). Plaintiff did
not respond thereto and the court accepted
the facts requested, as he properly was supposed to do, as being true, under Rule 45
[sic]. Defendant filed a motion for Summary Judgment, which, we conclude, properly was granted. 500 P,2d at 65.
Finally, in Utah Sand & Gravel Products Corp. v. Salt Lake
County Comm., 14 Utah 2d 151, 379 P.2d 379 (1963) (per curiam),
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the Court affirmed the trial court's summary judgment, which was
based upon admissions arising from defendant's failure to respond,
stating:
Under Rule 36, the facts requested are deemed to
be admitted. Sunnnary Judgment accordingly was
entered for plaintiff. 379 P.2d at 379.
There exists no question, therefore, that in this jurisdiction
deemed admissions arising from a party's failure to answer may
properly provide the basis for a summary judgment.

The language

of Rule 36 and the decisions of other courts conclusively establish that the same result obtains with respect to tardy responses.
In Weva Oil Corp. v. Belco Petroleum Corp., 68 F.R.D.
63(~.D.W.Va.

1975), Belco served requests for admission on Weva

and, one and one-half months thereafter, moved for summary judgment based upon Weva's deemed admissions.

Prior to the hearing

of the motion for SUllllllary judgment, Weva filed responses and
moved the court for leave tardily to file such responses, asserting that the delay was caused by a clerical error in the office of Weva's attorney.

The court entered summary judgment

reasoning that permitting such tardy responses would prejudice
Belco by requiring it to prove the deemd admissions and stated:
[W]ere the court to grant relief on the facts
here presented, i.e., an alleged procedural error, unsupported by affidavit, deposition, or
otherwise, in the office of a non-responding
party's attorney, the result would be to totally
nullify the time requirements set forth in Rule
36(a). The court has been directed to and can
locate no decision, with a fact situation similar to those presented in this action, where
relief was granted for untimely response. Id.
at 667 (Emphasis added),
Similarly, the Supreme Court of New Mexico offered the
following analysis respecting responses to requests that were
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filed seventeen days late. 6
"It is clear that, under our Rule 36 and
the identical federal rule, either the
unexcused late filing of an answer to
requests for admissions or the filing of
an unsworn answer is equivalent to the
filin of no answer accordin to the
terms o t e ru e itse
and to innumerable decisions on that question. . . .
Robinson v. Navajo Frei5ht Lines, Inc.,

70 N.M. 215, 372 P.2d 8 , 804 (1962).

Likewise, in Lawrence v. Southwest Gas Corp. , 89 Nev.
446, 514 P.2d 869 (1973), the Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed
a summary judgment upon facts strikingly similar to those here
presented:
Pursuant to NRCP 36(a), the appellant's
(plaintiffs below) were served with a formal
request to admit certain facts. Appellants
served neither timely answers nor timely object ions, and then they admitted facts that
negatived the existence of the claims alleged
in their Amended Complaint. Thereafter, without moving for permission to withdraw or amend
their admissions, appellants filed a belated
"Answer to Demand for Admissions," purporting
to deny the matters already admitted by operation of NRCP 36. On motion, the district
court granted summary judgment, from which
appellants have appealed, contending that
the district court "abused its discretion."
Assuming the district court had discretion to relieve appellants of their admissions, on its own motion, our review of
the record satisfies us that in this case
the court was justified in not doing so.
514 P.2d at 869.
To the same effect, on almost identical facts, see Salem v.
Lawyers Co-Operative Pub. Co., 137 Ga.App. 536, 224 S.E.2d 502
(1976).

6/ The court, however, did not consider the deemed admissions
because they were never offered into evidence at trial.
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Based both upon the express langauge of Rule 36(a) and
the foregoing authorities, Surrnnit Limited's failure timely to
respond to plaintiff's requests for admission effected a conclusive admission of the facts requested and provides an unassailable basis for the trial court's summary judgment.

Any argument

that Summit Limited may advance that its tardy responses negated
its deemed admissions is refuted by the express language of Rule
36(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:

"Any matter admitted un-

der this rule is conclusively established unless the court on
motion permits withdrawal or amendment of the admission."
phasis added).

(Em-

Summit Limited never so moved the court below.

In Sims Motor Transportation Lines v. Foster, 293 S.W.
2d 226 (Ky. 1956), the Supreme Court of Kentucky held that the
trial court properly refused to permit the recipient of requests for admission to file tardy responses because the recipient party had never moved the court to withdraw his deen1ed
admissions pursuant to Rule 36(b).
~ountain

The appellate court in

View Enterprises v. Diversified Systems, 133 Ga.App.

249, 211 S.E. 186 (1974) squarely held that a trail court has no
discretion to accept tardy responses as negating deemed admissions unless the responding party so moves the court pursuant
to Rule 36(b).

There, the appellate court reversed the trial

court's denial of a motion for surrnnary judgment because the
trail court improperly ignored deemed admissions:
Code Ann. §81A-136(a) [almost identical to U.R.C.P. Rule 36(a)] . . . states
clearly that as to request for admissions
the matter is admitted unless answers or
objections are filed to such request within
30 days after service of said request . . .
The defendant waited until motion for summary judgment was filed before answering.
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The court has discretion in such matter
onl! when a party moves to determine the
suf iciency of answers or objections filed
to the re uest. Here there were no timelv
o ·ections nor answers unti after the passage o_
ays, an t e reqeusts were a mitted as a matter of law. [Citation omitted].
!{hen defendant finall filed his answers to
request or admissions,
ays a ter service,
he made no motion that he be granted the privilege of filing at that late day. 211 S.E.
2d at 187 (Emphasis added).
Accordingly, because Summit Limited never moved the trial court
to withdraw its deemed admissions or to file its tardy response,
the trial court did not even have the Eower to ignore the deemed
admissions.
Sunnnit Limited seeks to generate a "genuine issue of
material fact" through the Affidavit of Steven H. Bauer.
660].

[R.

That Affidavit, however, as a matter of law, cannot af-

fect the conclusive effect of Summit Limited's deemed admissions.
Rule 36(b) provides that "[a]ny matter admitted under this rule
is ~onclusively established."

The courts have construed that

clear language to preclude modification of an admission by affidavit or otherwise.

In Creel v. Government EmEloyees Ins. Co.,

313 So.2d 772 (Fla.App. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 336 So.
2d 1170 (Fla. 1976), for example, defendant served requests for
admissions upon plaintiff, who did not respond but rather filed
an affid~vit controverting part of the requests.

Thereafter

the trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment.
Plaintiff appealed, arguing that his affidavit, which controverted
his deemed admissions, precluded sunnnary judgment.

The appellate

court held that the plaintiff's deemed admissions were conclusive, and the affidavit was legally ineffectual to vary or conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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trovert the deemed admissions.

The Supreme Court of Nevada

similarly concluded in ¥estern Mercury Ins. v. The Rix Co., 84 Nev.
218, 438 P.2d 792 (1968).

There, the court held that deemed ad-

missions, in the context of a motion for summary judmgnet, cannot be varied by the party's contrary answers to interrogatories.
By the express terms of Rule 36 and the authorities just discussed, the Bauer Affidavit cannot, as a matter of law, affect
the conclusive effect of the admissions of Summit Limited.

The

trial court properly relied upon the admissions of Sunnnit Limited in granting sunnnary judgment against Sunnnit Limited:
7.
Because defendant Summit Limited failed
timely to serve responses to plaintiff's said Request for Admission of Facts, which were twice
served upon defendant, the matters contained
therein are deemed admitted pursuant to Rule 36,
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. * * * [R. 68990].
Based upon those admissions, plaintiff is unquestionably entitled
to its sunnnary judgment against Summit Limited.
B.

There exists no genuine issue of fact respt~cting
the liability of Sunnnit Limited to Plaintiff.

Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, prescribes
that summary judgment shall be rendered "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any moving fact and that the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law."

The trial court found, as re·

quired by Rule 56(c), as follows:
9.
The pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavit of J. C. Wheelwright
show that there is no genuine issue as to any
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material fact and that plaintiff is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law as moved
against defendant Sunrrnit Limited, (R. 690].
The Affidavit of Mr. Wheelwright and the admissions of Sunrrnit
Limited, without more, establish that the district court was
correct in its ruling.

The admission by Summit Limited of

request numbers 12, 13, and 14 [R. 543-44] conclusively establish the following facts:
1.

On July 8, 1974, plaintiff and Summit

Limited through its agent, Ski Park City West,
entered into the contract attached as Exhibit
"A" to the admissions.

[Request 12, R. 543,

R. 545].

2.

Under the parties' said contract,

plaintiff. agreed to perform various grading,
paving, and related work upon the subdivision.
[Request 12, R. 543].
3.

Under the terms of the parties' con-

tract, Summit Limited agreed, through its
agent Ski Park City West, Inc., to pay plaintiff for such work within ten days of the
completion of same.
4.

[Request 12, R. 543-44].

Plaintiff has completed its agreed

performance under the parties' contract and all
conditions precedent to plaintiff's right to
compensation have been satisfied.

[Requests

13, 14; R. 544].
5.

Pursuant to the terms of the par-

ties' contract, Summit Limited owes to plainSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tiff the sum of $38,196.65, together with interest thereon at the rate of twelve percent
per annum from and after August 8, 1976, until paid, less the sum of $2, 081. 60.

[R. 623-

26].
As established in the preceding section, the matters established
through Summit Limited's admissions (items 1, 2, 3, and 4 above)
are conclusively established and cannot be varied by affidavit
or otherwise.

With respect to the matters contained in item 4

above, the affidavit of J. C. Wheelwright is uncontroverted.
Based only upon the admissions of Summit Limited and the Wheelwright Affidavit, therefore, summary judgment was properly
granted to plaintiff.

The balance of the record likewise sup-

ports that conclusion.
The Statement of Facts contained in this Brief, which,
as noted therein, places no reliance on Summit Limited's admissions, establishes that Condor International, Summit Limited,
Ski Park City West, and National Property Management had corrrrnon
officers, organizers, and partners.

In many cases, these or-

ganizations' officers functioned in common and did not distinguish the affairs of one entity from another.

By the NPM Agree-

ment, National Property Management purchased the subdivision and
connnitted itself to pay for the installation of paved streets
throughout the subdivision.
21.E].

[Plaintiff's App. p. 9 , paragraph

Pursuant to the Summit Limited Agreement, which was

executed concurrently with the NPM Agreement, Surrrrnit Limited
"[i]n the event of an anticipated default by [National Property
Management]" could "assume [National Property Management's]
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position" in the NPM Agreement.
21; R. 667].

[Defendant's App. 29, paragraph

National Property Management did default, and

Surrrrnit Limited assumed its position in the NPM Agreement, receiving from National Property Management a conveyance of all subdivision lots therefore conveyed to National Property Management.

[R. 643].

Thereafter, National Property Manageme'

ceased development of the subdivision, and Steven Bauer and
Surrrrnit Limited were to commence development of the subdivision.
[Depo. Richard Hallmark, p. 23; Depo. Robert Krause, pp. 9-10,
13-14].

Plaintiff then entered into a contract executed by

Ski Park City West, the agent of Summit Limited.

[R. 543, 545).

Hallmark, who signed the contract with plaintiff, was the
President of Condor, the then-general partner of Summit Limited.

Hallmark signed the contract pursuant to instructions by

Roy Webley, also an officer of Condor and organizer and limited
partner of Summit Limited.

At the time that the contract was

executed, Ski Park City West had absolutely no interest in the
subdivision and both it and National Property Management were
having financial difficulties -- both are now insolvent.
Richard Hallmark, p. 11, 23].

[Depo.

Thus, it is clear that both fac-

tually and contractually, Summit Limited, the owner of the subdivision, through its agent, Ski Park City West, which had no
interest in the subdivision, entered into and became responsible to pay pursuant to the contract with plaintiff.

Although

Summit Limited, through the Bauer Affidavit, states that "[i]t
is my information and belief that at no time did SKI PARK CITY
WEST, INC. act in the capacity as an agent or in any other
capacity on behalf of SUMMIT LTD." [R. 661], Mr. Bauer's affiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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davit is not credible -- In answers to interrogatories, Mr.
Bauer indicates that because he was not the general partner of
Summit Limited at the time, he does not know who was to procure
or be responsible to pay for the paved roads upon the subdivision.

[Interrogatory No. 14; Defendant's App. 35-36; R. 313,

644).

It must be again emphasized, however, that neither affi-

davit nor interrogatories may vary the conclusive admissions
of 8ummit Limited, which entitle plaintiff to the summary judgment now on appeal.
CONCLUSION
Summit Limited did not appear at the hearing that resulted in the judgment here on appeal, nor did it present any written argument to the district court in connection with that hearing 7 .

Each and every argument presented in the Brief of Summit

Limited was not presented to the district court.

Under well es-

tablished principles of appellate review, those arguments cannot
properly be considered for the first time by this Court.

State

y. Larkin, 27 Utah 2d 295, 495 P.2d 818 (1972); Simpson v. General
Motors Corp., 24 Utah 2d 301, 470 P.2d 399 (1970).
The trial court properly found that Summit Limited, without excuse or justification, persistently refused to respond to
plaintiff's four separate discovery requests, most of which were
served twice, in a timely fashion.

Sununit Limited has still not

LI

Seventeen days passed between service of Notice of the hearing and the hearing itself.
[R. 620, 633, 688). The record is
devoid of any explanation why Sunnnit Limited did not attend the
hearing.
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filed a response to plaintiff's request for production of documents, and Summit Limited's response to plaintiff's first interrogatories was ten months late.

Rule 37(d) empowered the

trial court to enter the default of Surmnit Limited both for its
outright failure to respond and its tardy responses which were
prompted by plaintiff's motion for sanctions.

Under the circum-

stances presented here, Summit Limited's assertion that the
entry of default against it amounted to an abuse of discretion
cannot be taken seriously.
The record reflects that Summit Limited did not respond
timely to plaintiff's requests for admissions and never moved
the court, as clear1y required by Rule 36(b), to be relieved of
its admissions effected by operation of Rule 36(a).

Those con-

clusive admissions, which cannot be varied by eleventh hour affidavits and interrogatory responses, unquestionably entitle
plaintiff to summary judgment, as the district court found.
Summit Limited, which never moved below to be relieved of its
admissions and never complained below of the nature or character of its admissions, cannot properly now deny or seek to be
relieved of those admissions by this Court.
Both the default judgment and the summary judgment entered by the district court are supported by the record.

The

district court's Judgment should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMLTTED

this/~ day of April, 1977.

MARTINEAU & MAAK

PlaintiffRespondent
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[R. 558]
AGREEMENT

1.

THIS AGREEMENT made this 15th day of November,

1973, by and between PARK WEST VILLAGE, INC., a Utah corporation hereinafter designated as "Seller", and NATIONAL PROPERTY
MANAGEMENT, INC., a Utah corporation, hereinafter designated
as "Buyer" of 647 Camino De Los Mares, San Clemente, California
92672.
2

WITNESSETH:

That the Seller for the consideration

herein mentioned agrees to sell and convey to the Buyer and
the Buyer for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to
purchase the real property situate in Sunnnit County, State of
Utah

k~own

as Park West Village and more particularly described

in the Title Policy attached hereto as Exhibit A.

Seller rep-

resents that a portion of said real property is included in a
subdivision more particularly described on the Plat, recorded
as entry #116341 with the Summit County Recorder and that said
subdivision consists of certain sold and unsold lots as more
particularly set forth on the Inventory attached hereto as
Exhibit B.

The lot numbers on said Inventory relate to said

Plat and the unsold lots designated thereon are included within the real property which is the subject of this Agreement.
The lots designated as having been sold on said Inventory include lots sold by deed and by contract and are not part of
the sub.i ect of this sale.
3.

Said Buyer hereby agrees to enter into possession

and pay for said premises the sum of $485,000.00, payable at
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the office of Seller his assigns or order, 24 South Main Street,
Logan, Utah 84321. strictly within the following terms, to-wit:
$110,000.00 cash on or before December 13.
1973, and the balance of $375,000.00 shall be paid
as follows:
$31,000.00 plus interest accrued on the total
balance as of the date of the payment on March 1,
1974; $30,000.00 plus accrued interest accrued on
the total balance

[R. 559)

as of the date of the payment on the 15th day of
Augu~t

and the 15th day of December of each of

the years 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, and 1978 and
for August 15, 1979, with a payment of $14,000.00
plus interest accrued to date as of December 15,
1979.
The Buyer may pay a maximum of $120,000.00 principal plus any
interest accrued, per year.

In the event that pre-payment of

any amount above this is made, the Buyer shall pay a penalty of
an additional $21,250.00 in any given year in which said maximum requirement of payment is exceeded.

Possession of said

premises shall be delivered to Buyer on the date of the first
payment.

From the date hereof until possession is delivered

or until Buyer has defaulted under this Agreement, Buyer shall
have access to the property to make surveys, soil tests and to
conduct other engineering activities.
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4.

Interest shall be charged from the date hereof on

all unpaid portions of the purchase price at the rate of 8
1/2% per annum.

5.

It is understood and agreed that if the Seller

accepts payment from the Buyer on this Contract less than according to the terms herein mentioned, then by so doing it will
in no way alter the terms of the Contract as to the forfeiture
hereinafter stipulated or as to any other remedies of the Seller.
6.

It is understood that there presently exists an

obligation against said property in favor of Earl and Anna
Pressler which has been assigned to Downey State Bank with an
unpaid balance of $18,000.00 as of December l,_ 1973, which obligation is to be paid by Seller.

7.

The Seller agrees to release and convey fee simple

title to parcels of land to the Buyer upon receipt of amounts
listed with respect to each parcel as set froth on Exhibit C
and in accordance with the terms specified therein.
8.

Seller represents that there are no unpaid spe-

cial improvement district taxes covering improvements to said
premises now in the process of being installed or which have
been completed and not paid for.
9.

Buyer Rnd Seller agree that they will not mort-

gage or otherwise enctnnber any unreleased property which is
the subject matter of this Contract; however, Buyer may record
a notice of this Contract at its election.
10.

The Buyer agrees to pay all taxes and assessments

of every kind and nature which are or which may be assessed and
which may become due on these premises during the life of this
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Agreement.

[R. 560]

11.

The Buyer agrees to pay the general taxes due and

payable after the date hereof.
12.

The Buyer further agrees to keep all insurable

buildings and improvements on said premises insured in a company acceptable to the Seller in an amount not less than the appraised value thereof and to insure the shop for a minimum amount
of $20,000.00 and to include the Seller as a co-insured party as
his interest may appear and to deliver a certificate with respect to such an insurance policy to Seller.
13.

In the event the Buyer shall default in the pay-

ment of any special or general taxes, assessments, or insurance
premiums as herein provided, the seller may, at his option, pay
said taxes, assessments and insurance premiums or either of
them, and if Seller elects so to do, then the Buyer agrees to
repay the Seller upon demand, all such sums so advanced and
paid by him, together with interest thereon from date of payment of said sums at the rate of 3/4 of one percent per month
until paid.
14.

Buyer agrees that he will not commit or suffer to

be committed any waste, spoil, or destruction in or upon said
premises, and that he will maintain said premises in good condition.
15.

In the event of a failure to comply with the terms

hereof by the Buyer, or upon failure of the Buyer to make any
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payment or payments when the same shall become due, or within
sixty (60) days thereafter, the Seller, at his option shall
have the following alternative remedies:

(The sixty (60) day

grace period shall not apply to the Buyer's obligation to pay
$110,000.00 cash on or before December_ 13, 1973).

A.

Seller shall have the right, upon

failure of the Buyer to remedy the default
within five days after written notice, to be
released from all obligations in law and in
equity to convey said property, and all payments which have been made theretofore on
this contract by the Buyer, shall be forfeited to the Seller as liquidated damages for
the nonperformance of the contract, and the
Buyer agrees that the Seller may at his option
reenter and take possession of said premises
without legal processes as in its first and

[R. 561]

former estate, together with all improvements
and additions made by the Buyer thereon, and
the said additions and improvements shall remain with the land and become the property of
the Seller, the Buyer becoming at once a tenant
at will of the Seller; or
B.

The Seller may bring suit and re-

cover judgment for all delinquent installments,
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including costs and attorney's fees.

(The use

of this remedy on one or more occasions shall
not prevent the Seller, at his option, from resorting to one of the other remedies hereunder
in the event of a subsequent default); or
C.

The Seller shall have the right, at

his option, and upon written notice to the BLyer,
to declare the entire unpaid balance hereunder at
once due and payable, and may elect to treat this
Contract as a note and mortgage, and pass title
to the Buyer subject thereto and proceed immediately to foreclose the same in accordance with
the laws of the State of Utah, and have the property sold and the proceeds applied to the payment of the balance owing, including costs and
attorney's fees; and the Seller may have a judgment for any deficiency which may remain.

In the

case of foreclosure, the Seller hereunder, upon
the filing of a Complaint, shall be immediately
entitled to the appointment of a receiver to
take possession of said mortgage property and
collect the rents, issues and profits therefrom
and apply the same to the payment of the obligation hereunder, or hold the same pursuant to
order of the court; and the Seller, upon entry
of judgment of foreclosure, shall be entitled to
the possession of the said premises during the
period of redemption.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

App. 6

16.

It is agreed that time is the essence of this

Agreement.

17.

Seller will make available to Buyer all cost

accounting

[R. 562]

infonnation relating to construction of improvements on the
subject property.

18.

It is hereby expressly understood and agreed by

the parties hereto that the Buyer accepts the said property in
its present condition and that there are no representations,
covenants, or agreements between the parties hereto
ferenc~

wit~

re-

to said property, except as herein specifically set

forth or contained in the attached exhibits.

19.

The Buyer and Seller each agree that should they

default in any of the covenants or agreements contained herein, that the defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses,
including a reasonable attorney's fees, which may arise or accrue from enforcing this Agreement, or in obtaining possession
of the premises covered hereby, or in pursuing any remedy provided hereunder or by the statutes of the State of Utah whether
such remedy is pursued by filing a suit or otherwise.

20.

This Contract is assignable by the Buyer.

How-

ever, Buyer shall give written notice of any s~ch agreement
and provide a copy thereof to Seller.

21.

The parties acknowledge that there are certain

outstanding liquidated and unliquidated potential liabilities
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or liens or encumbrances relating to the property which is the
sub.i ect of this Contract, all of which Seller represents are
described below.

An itemization of these matters is not to be

construed as an admission by the Seller that any said claim is
in fact a valid or existing liability but is merely a statement
as to the manner in which any such potential problem will be
handled as between the Buyer and the Seller.
A.

Title Insurance Policy.

The Buyer accepts the property, subject to the liens and
encumbrances set forth in the Title Insurance Policy.
B.

Building and Occupancy Restrictions and Declaration
of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions of Park
West Village Condominium -- Phase I and Phase II.

[R. 563]

The Seller has previously caused to be filed with the
County Recorder of Summit County, Building and Occupancy Restrictions, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit D and
Declarations, Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions of Park
West Village Condominium (the "Declarations") attached hereto
as Exhibit E.

Seller represents that identical Declarations

are recorded against both Phase I and Phase II of the Park
West Village Condominium project.

The Seller hereby assigns

all of its right, title and interest in and to the Building
and Occupancy Restrictions and the Declarations to the Buyer
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ship of the Subdivision Management Conrrnittee and agrees to
deliver to Buyer a certified copy of the resolution of its
Board of Directors effecting such appointments.

In the event

of a default hereunder, all rights under said Building and Occupancy Restrictions and the Declarations shall immediately
revert back to the Seller and the Seller shall have the sole
right to exercise all powers set forth therein.

The Buyer

agrees with Seller and for its benefit that while there is any
portion of the real property not released pursuant to Section
7 hereof, it shall abide by and enforce all of the provisions,
covenants and obligations of the Building and Occupancy Restrictions and the Declarations and to pay all costs and expenses incidental thereto.
D.

Subdivision Master Plan.

The Buyer acknowledges that a Subdivision Master Plan,
attached hereto as Exhibit F and incorporated herein by reference has been used in the promotion and development of the
subject property.

The Buyer agrees to comply with said Master

Plan insofar as may be necessary to prevent the Seller from
accruing liability which may result from a deviation from the
Master Plan and to hold the Seller harmless from any liability
accruing in the event that the Buyer chooses to deviate from
the Master Plan.
E.

Summit County Subdivision Rules, Regulations
and Requirements.

The Buyer agrees that it is purchasing the project as
is and that it will perform all duties, responsibilities and
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obligations to comply with the rules and regulations of Summit
County as it may generally apply to

[R. 564]

subdivisions and with the specific requirements imposed by Summit County with respect to this subdivision project, including,
but not limited to, the construction of roads.
22.

The Seller hereby conveys to the Buyer the sole

right to use the name Park West Village and agrees to change
its name.

In the event of an unrectified default by the Buyer,

the rights to the name shall revert to the Seller.
23.

The Seller presently has an arrangement witr. Tracy

Collins Bank·& Trust whereby it has borrowed $30,000.00 and
deposited the same in the form of a Certificate of Deposit
which is the subject of a contract whereby the Certificate of
Deposit is pledged to guarantee the performance of the construction of lots as required by Summit County for the Park West
Village subdivision.

The Buyer agrees to perform all require-

ments of construction of said improvements as required by Summit County.

The Certificate of Deposit, which is guaranteeing

the construction of these improvements and the loan at Tracy
Collins Bank & Trust, is hereby assigned to the Buyer, who
agrees to pay the interest on the $30,000.00 loan.

The interest

will be paid to the Seller at its address stated herein, and
the Seller will then pay Tracy Collins Bank & Trust.

The

Buyer agrees to hold the Seller harmless from any claim by
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Tracy Collins Bank & Trust for this obligation, and the Buyer
agrees to pay the $30,000.00 loan in full, which it may do by
offsetting the Certificate of Deposit against said loan upon
the completion of the requirements of Summit County and the
receipt from Summit County of the discharge of the bond obligation.

Seller agrees to cooperate in the preparation of any

supplemental documentation or in any other way reasonably necessary to complete the provisions of this Paragraph.

The Buyer

agrees to render said improvements as required by this Paragraph and complete the same in a manner acceptable to Summit
County by July 15, 1974.

In the event that the Buyer fails

to complete the improvements by that date, then the Seller may
complete said improvements and in that event, the Buyer agrees
to pay to the Seller $15,000.00 liquidation damages and costs
of the imprcvements, with the $15,000.00 payable on July 20,
1974, and the costs of improvements payable upon the completion of the same.

In the event of a default, the default shall

[R. 565]
constitute a reassignment to the Seller of the Certificate of
Deposit at Tracy Collins Bank & Trust, and the Buyer shall
thereupon reassign the obligation to pay the loan balance and
the Certificate of Deposit, or the proceeds thereon may be
used to render the required improvements.

In the event of a

default by the Buyer, under the terms of this Contract, the
Buyer shall remain liable to pay all interest accruing after
the date of this Contract at Tracy Collins Bank & Trust.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

App. 11

24.

All water rights appertaining to the subject pro-

perty shall be conveyed to the Buyer at the time the property parcels are released.

The parties who own dwelling units on lots in

Park West Village subdivision as of the date of this Contract
shall have the right to tie in and connect to Park West Water Assocation, a nonprofit Utah corporation, and to acquire and tc
have the ability to acquire water at association rates in effect
from time to time.

The Buyer agrees to assume any obligation

which the Seller may have and to hold the Seller harmless therefrom to provide water to the buyers of lots in Park West Village
Subdivision which have not yet constructed a dwelling thereon.
The right of the existing dwelling o>mers under this Paragraph
shall not be abrogated in the event that the Seller exercises
its rights un9er Paragraph 15.
25.

The payment due on or before December 13, 1973,

from Buyer to Seller is subject to the Seller providing Warranty
Deeds subject to existing mortgages at First Security Bank and
Title Insurance Policies on the five condominium units, numbers
4, 10, 12, 14, and 16, which are the subject of a Uniform Real
Estate Contract of even date herewith.

The Seller's duty under

this Paragraph is to deliver said Warranty Deeds and Title Insurance Policies to Summerhays, Hatch & Lawrence, and Summerhays, Hatch & Lawrence shall deliver said Warranty Deeds and
Title Insurance Policies to the Buyers upon the receipt of payment of the cash difference between the mortgage balances and
$34,700.00 on units 4, 14, and 16, and $36,700.00 on units 10
and 12.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the said parties to this Agreement
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have hereunto signed their names, the day and year first above
written.

PARI< WEST VILLAGE, INC., Seller

NATIONAL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, INC., Buyer

By:/s/ Elwood L. Nielsen
President

By: /s/ Robert Krause
President
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that two copies of the foregoing Brief
of Plaintiff-Respondent were served this

/~ day of April, 1977,

by mailing on said date two copies thereof, United States Mail,
first class postage prepaid, addressed to:
Timothy R. Hanson, Esq.
HANSON, WADSWORTH & RUSSON
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant
702 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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